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- CAPEセミナーProf. Michael Blome-Tillmann (McGill/Cambridge)
CAPEセミナーProf. Michael Blome-Tillmann (McGill/Cambridge)
CAPEセミナーProf. Michael Blome-Tillmann (McGill/Cambridge)
日時 2014年3月27日（木）午後４時半〜
場所 京都大学本部構内総合研究棟二号館南棟一階第10演習室
講演者 Prof. Michael Blome-Tillmann (McGill/Cambridge)
タイトル Solving the Moorean Puzzle
アブストラクト
This talk addresses and aims to resolve an epistemological puzzle that has attracted much attention in the recent literature―namely, the puzzle arising from Moorean anti-sceptical reasoning and the phenomenon of transmission failure. I argue that an appealing account of Moorean reasoning can be given by distinguishing carefully between two subtly different ways of thinking about justification and evidence. Once the respective distinctions are in place we have a simple and straightforward way to model both the Wrightean position of transmission failure and the Moorean position of dogmatism. The approach developed in this article is, accordingly, ecumenical in that it allows us to embrace two positions that are widely considered to be incompatible. The paper further argues that the Moorean Puzzle can be resolved by noting the relevant distinctions and our insensitivity towards them: once we carefully tease apart the different senses of ‘justified’ and ‘evidence’ involved, the bewilderment caused by Moore’s anti-sceptical strategy subsides.
場所 京都大学本部構内総合研究棟二号館南棟一階第10演習室
講演者 Prof. Michael Blome-Tillmann (McGill/Cambridge)
タイトル Solving the Moorean Puzzle
アブストラクト
This talk addresses and aims to resolve an epistemological puzzle that has attracted much attention in the recent literature―namely, the puzzle arising from Moorean anti-sceptical reasoning and the phenomenon of transmission failure. I argue that an appealing account of Moorean reasoning can be given by distinguishing carefully between two subtly different ways of thinking about justification and evidence. Once the respective distinctions are in place we have a simple and straightforward way to model both the Wrightean position of transmission failure and the Moorean position of dogmatism. The approach developed in this article is, accordingly, ecumenical in that it allows us to embrace two positions that are widely considered to be incompatible. The paper further argues that the Moorean Puzzle can be resolved by noting the relevant distinctions and our insensitivity towards them: once we carefully tease apart the different senses of ‘justified’ and ‘evidence’ involved, the bewilderment caused by Moore’s anti-sceptical strategy subsides.
